Theories
of Intelligence Studies and Practice
Research
Paper Week 4
Hypothesis: I hypothesize,
that: “matrix/synergy/hybrid intelligence theory,” is presently, the most
effective way, for me to collect required intelligence information, and to
perform my duties competently, as an intelligence officer-both: in my
academics, as well, as in the field, where I am an active practitioner-as,
recently demonstrated by Russia, when they peacefully invaded: The Crimea, and,
initiated a change of power, which, concluded, with a safe transition of
power-from terrorists in the Ukraine, back to the original Russian government
of Moscow, under the direction, of: President Putin.
Due: January 29, 2017
American Public
University System (APUS) Intl 500
2nd Master’s
Degree Intelligence and Global Studies
Student Report: Miss.
Bayo Elizabeth Cary, AA, BA, MLIS
Body
of Literature Review and Research Paper:
Introduction:
What
is “Intelligence?”
Strategic intelligence
may be defined broadly as a set of activities conducted by government agencies
that operate largely in secret. These activities include, foremost, the
collection and interpretation of information drawn from a mixture of open and
clandestine sources to arrive at a product—knowledge—useful to illuminate
foreign policy deliberations. This is intelligence as narrowly and
traditionally defined. (Johnson 2003, 1)
What
is theory?
Prior to explaining, a
few of the predominant theories, in the field, of intelligence, and how and
why, they are applicable, to both the: study, and practice-it is necessary, to
first define: “intelligence.” A theory, is utilized, to support a hypothesis,
in deductive reasoning. The theory, behind a hypothesis, is the logical
deductive way, from the general, to the specific-which leads to a hypothetical
conclusion, that can be “falsified.” It is not possible, to argue for a
hypothesis, if there are not strong, and well-established theories, to support
your argument-and in favor of your hypothesis.
Loch Johnson (2003), in his
peer-reviewed journal article: “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of
Intelligence,” also refers to: “matrix/synergy/hybrid theory of intelligence,”
as the: “cycle of intelligence.” Because
you collect information, from various resources, and then, the intelligence is
analyzed, and added to your growing collection, and then-it is necessary to
gather more information-from the same, or different sources again-to add to the
collection of information-again: “cycle of intelligence:”
In-reality, the
intelligence “cycle” is less a series of smoothly integrated phases, one
leading to another, than a complex matrix of interactions among intelligence
officers (the “producers” of intelligence) and the policy officials they serve
(the “consumers”). This matrix—a composite of intricate human and bureaucratic
relationships—is characterized by interruptions, mid-course corrections, and
multiple feedback loops. (Johnson 2003, 2)
Hypothesis:
“Matrix/Synergy/Hybrid”:
My hypothesis, for this
particular research paper-which, is intended, to explore some of the theories,
behind the study and practice of intelligence-is, that, a: “matrix/synergy/hybrid
theory,” is currently, the most effective intelligence strategy, for
collecting, the necessary and required intelligence information, to be, a more
competent and reliable, intelligence officer (Johnson 2003, 2). A:
“matrix/synergy/hybrid theory of intelligence,” is both an: antiquated, as well
as a contemporary, theory of intelligence (Johnson 2003, 2). Although, the
specific nomenclature, has altered some, the definition-regarding the
utilization, of, a: variety of resources, and information outlets, to answer
an: “intelligence query,” and to accomplish, an: “intelligence mission,” does
in fact, have the same general meaning.
The application of a theory, differs,
to-a-great-extent, from, the theory itself sometimes. A country can advertise,
that, they practice a certain type of intelligence theory, and, that the
theory, is in support of certain objectives-when in fact, the information, that
they told you-was: “government propaganda, and counterintelligence.” From
antiquity, there has been a lack of satisfaction, with life, and, all it has-to-offer,
and that-for centuries, has left some, wanting too much, for what, was never
theirs to have:
Examining the impact of
culture on intelligence is in actuality not a recent investigation. Bonthous specifically tackled the issue over
two decades ago. Unfortunately, that work showed the dichotomy that would come
to epitomize the treatment of culture within Intelligence Studies overall. (Crosston
2015, 26)
Theory
of International Relations:
Some would argue, that,
it is in fact a: “Deus De Machina,” and not a specific: “culture,” that
defines, how individual states-interact with each other, in all matters,
pertaining to “intelligence,” and to “international relations, (Crosston 2015,
26).” Some, argue too strongly-in regards to, an International theory, of
“intelligence,” that, is strictly politically based. It is more a contemporary
political ideology, that, there should be a theory of “intelligence,” which,
revolves around: “international relations”-the study, and the practice of:
I.R.:
Popular perceptions and
general understanding of the nature of intelligence and its role in
international relations leaves much to be desired. A starting point is the
question: what is intelligence? The way intelligence is defined necessarily
conditions approaches to research and writing about the subject. (Jackson and
Scott 2004,141)
Jackson and Scott (2004),
argue, in their peer-reviewed journal article: “The Study of Intelligence in
Theory and Practice,” that because countries, are individual players, there is
no simple way, to define a theory of “intelligence,” based on the practices,
of: International Relations (Jackson and Scott 2004, 141). It is clear, that
there are too many varieties, of political and ruling styles, and, directions-to
narrow a theory of intelligence down enough, so that, it encompasses-the entire
planet.
Because, governments
rule-autonomously, the direction, and type of: “intelligence,” and theory
behind practice, are narrowly construed-as to be, country specific, and, as to
be, ruler specific-as well. That-being-said, the United States, is not immune,
to changes in: theories, studies, and applications-in the field of:
“intelligence.”
Theory of Deception:
In the late 1990’s, the United States, under
the direction, of the Clinton Administration, began a switch, from an
International intelligence policy of: “transparency,” to a policy of:
“deception” (Johnson 2003, 11). Johnson (2003), “Bricks and Mortar, For A
Theory of Intelligence,” discusses, the slow passing of political states in the
US, from the First Bush Administration, through to the Second Bush
Administration, to and highlights, how changes in U.S. “intelligence,”
contributed to: 9/11, and then-also to, the resolution and relief, that America
never experienced-after: 9/11. The theory of intelligence, based on
“deception,” and proselytized-in the late 1990’s, can be accurately described,
as the following (Whaley 2014, 178):
It is pragmatic,
presented as 1) a teaching tool for persons concerned with deception and
counter-deception, either as practitioners or potential victims; and 2) an
analytical tool or model for deception operations, specifically as a check-list
to assure that all aspects have been covered, all bases touched, in the design,
analysis, or detection of deception operations. (Whaley 2014, 178)
A policy of “deception,”
in politics, as well as in “intelligence”-is never a good idea. There is the
existence, of: “counter intelligence,” however, counter intelligence, and a “policy
of deception”-are not the same. The U.S., has a history, of sharing
intelligence information, with other countries, internationally-that we
consider allies.
However, beginning with the Clinton Administration-even
with our long history, of sharing intelligence information, and relying upon
each other for support, countries like the United Kingdom-who used to be close
to the US, could no longer trust America, to tell them, the truth (Aldrich
2015, 394). It did not matter at all, to the Clinton Administration,
that-eventually, the “deception policy,” would come-to-light, and, would have
to be discussed-regarding, how an international political “policy of
deception,” impacted the US, as well as, how that extreme dishonesty, also
hurt-our closest allies.
Immediately prior to: 9/11, the
political climate internationally-altered dramatically. There had been years of
rest, and peace, in some Western European countries, and then, in 2008-2009,
all-of-a-sudden, Israel, was attacking people-all over Europe-as terrorists:
“suicide bombers,” from Israel, and worse (Muller-Wille 2008, 49):
Following the attacks in
New York, Madrid and London, intelligence and security agencies in Europe and
around the world concurred on the need to work more closely together in
response to the new international terrorist threat. However, most of the
increased collaboration takes place outside the EU framework despite its
established structures for intelligence co-operation. (Muller-Wille 2008, 49)
Apparently, European
intelligence networks, were well-aware of the fact, that Israel, was organizing
outside of the confines of Europe, and then-somehow, entering various European
cities, to incite violence (Muller-Wille 2008, 49).
However, it also appears, that while
European intelligence communities, understood-to some extent, what was
occurring-there seems to have been, no efforts what-so-ever, none by US
government, or by European governments, to deter the terror attacks, by Israel.
The US, had information, about active terror cells, that were no longer
sleeping in the US, who were, online, and relying heavily, on international
communications, to contact other active terror cells in Europe, and, America
fallaciously-chose, not to share, that vital information, with our European
allied nations (Johnson 2003, 11). The Clinton Administration, crippled US International
intelligence communications, our US CIA-was silenced (Johnson 2003, 20).
Immediately, proceeding the 9/11
attack, in the United States, our American FBI, decided to ignore, intelligence
information-which they had, in fact been given, regarding the planned terror
attack, on the Twin Towers-in New York City (Johnson 2003, 12). I am not an
intelligence officer, working for the United States. I do not know how, the US:
FBI, or CIA, or any other branch of the US intelligence community, can defend,
intentionally ignoring, pertinent intelligence information, about a terror
attack, in the US?
For a member, of the US intelligence
community, to merely explain the situation away-as, a policy decision-even
handed down, by the US President himself-is never going to be, an excuse
enough. There are: moral and ethical requirements, attendant, to all
professional positons in the US-not just to: doctors, police, lawyers, judges,
and members of our US intelligence community. Walking away from a: moral and
ethical obligation-in defense of something as pliable, as a “political
ideology,” is never defensible in court-not in the US, or overseas, in an
International court room. Lives were lost. America-not just Americans-were
traumatized. Where is the recovery?
Orthodox Theory Versus Revisionist
Theory of Intelligence:
After the tragedy of 9/11, America
freely and openly admitted, that the causes, had been the fault-to a large degree,
by the US intelligence community. The US intelligence community, admitted, to having
information, about the impending attack, and then-refusing to exact the US
government, against “domestic terrorists.”
Following, the 9/11 terror attacks, two different schools of
“intelligence,” became more pronounced within the US, for both: academics and practitioners-in
an attempt, to: define, explain, and excuse, the events of 9/11, the: “Orthodox
School of Intelligence Theory,” versus, “The Revisionist School of Intelligence
Theory” (Honig 2007, 699):
Herein is an effort to
advance intelligence theory building by putting forth a theoretical framework
to help adjudicate between two competing intelligence schools: the Orthodox
School, which argues that the inherent pathologies and obstacles in the work of
intelligence make every attempt of surprise attack an almost certain success,
and the Revisionist School, which asserts that the roots of surprise attacks
lie in avoidable failures of certain intelligence people. (Honig 2007, 699)
In fact, as previously
discussed, the attack, by terrorists, from active/domestic terror cells, within
the US, on the New York City Twin Towers-was not a surprise. Both the:
“Orthodox School of intelligence theory,” and the: “Revisionist School of
Intelligence theory,” are applicable, to the disaster-that resulted, here, in
America, on 9/11 (Honig 2007, 699).
Professionals, who are hired, to work
for the US government, at both: the FBI, and, the CIA-ignore intelligence
information-on a regular basis. In fact, when Mr. Obama was still president, of
the US, the CIA, had an online “tip” submission form, and, they refused to
accept it, as well as, almost all phone calls to their offices. The CIA, blocked my laptop, IP addresses, on
a regular basis-while Mr. Obama, was president, of the US. I literally, could
not report anything to the CIA-except for a few brief phone calls-for almost 8
years.
Additionally, the US government, has
a history of hiring people-for any given employment position, who, have never
been smart enough, to earn their degree, or, to practice in their field of
study. America, hires people, who are not qualified to work-all-of-the-time. At,
the very same time- America, refuses to hire someone, who is more suitable, for
a specific employment position, for any given reason-superficial: political,
religious, sexual orientation, or other reasons-which, is not legal in America.
America has rules and laws, which
state, that: housing, and employment, are to be offered equally, to those
equally qualified, for those in need, and, with no pre-supposed prejudices,
based on: race, religion, political affiliation, culture, etc.-and, that
simply, is not the reality. America, is dangerous. It is a country, that is
supposed to be safe. America, is crisscrossed with thousands of: rules, laws,
and legislation-offering protections, for: civil, and human rights. America, is
most likely, one of the most dangerous, and unpleasant countries-on the entire
planet-and, that is the reality.
Although, the theories of intelligence,
are actively changing in the US, from presidency, to presidency, and from
decade, to decade-the situation in the US, really has not improved, since 9/11.
I would argue, that, it has been, just the opposite-America has lost an edge,
since: 9/11. America has lost the advantage. America is being excluded, from
the “intelligence information cycle.” America, is no longer in-the-know. The
“policy of deception,” implemented by the Clinton Administration, and then, the
downward spiraling cycle of events, that occurred, beginning with 9/11-has left
America, in the benthic zone, and, with no close International allies, who are
willing to trust, that America’s intelligence community, will ever be honest
enough.
It is no accident that
Shulsky and Schmitt titled their book Silent Warfare or that the Director of
Central Intelligence Robert Gates should tell junior CIA officers that the
nation is at peace because we are constantly at war. (Phythian 20, 57)
RAND-Failed Theory of
Intelligence:
America, is no longer at
peace. There is no longer, a quiet exchange, of covert intelligence information-protecting
the America public. America, is more dangerous today-perhaps, than, it has ever
been before. In 2017, revisiting, what never worked for America-in the past,
like the RAND Intelligence Community Workshops, in Arlington, VA-is not going
to be the answer, to a better and safer future, for the US (Boraz et al. 2006,
iii). There needs to be positive change for America, and our dilapidated
intelligence community. Some would agree, that another alteration, in theory,
applicable to the: study and practice, of US intelligence, is required, and I
agree!
Feminist Theory of
Intelligence:
There are woman, who are professionals, and,
who work in, both: the academic, and, in the field of US intelligence-who, are
presently arguing, that a “feminist” perspective-offers, a “fresh set of eyes,”
to the current US intelligence community quandary. Although, I have not been
hired-as-of-yet, I do, contact potential employers-almost exclusively overseas
though. I am both: studying in the field of intelligence, and, actively
working, and publishing, and sharing information-as a freelance reporter, and as
a member, of the International intelligence community (my active Google Blogger
account, that receives regular updates: www.baielizacary.blogspot.com).
As a woman, I am a strong supporter,
for a theory of intelligence, which is firmly rooted, in: “feminism.” As a
woman, I have a different ideology, about America, and, about war, and, about
how best, to utilize our limited American resources-to support, our denigrated,
and over-burdened, intelligence community. A cursory perusal, of a woman’s
professional writing, within the academic genre of: intelligence studies, does
on occasion, gain some attention-however, the attention in the past, has only
been fleeting:
While there has been
intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies
over the necessary ‘feminist credentials’ of some gendered analyses, it is
important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to
the field by such debates. (Shepherd 2009, 217)
Original
Tenets Behind US Intelligence Theory:
I would argue, that an
intelligence theory, that were based on the values, of “feminism,” and, that
would necessarily include, the professional writings, of female intelligence
officers-would have a stronger support, for the original intentions, of our US intelligence collection, and network.
Originally, the stated purposes, discussed regarding the collection, of
intelligence information, by the US government, was for:
1) The
increase of our national security;
2) To,
protect both: America, and Americans-and;
3) To
defend our: “American Dream,” and to protect, our: “US Constitutional Human
Rights (Johnson 2009, 10).”
As a woman, my children,
and my family-come first. I have a different psychological imprint, than a man,
because, I have a different physiologically chemistry, than a man. I am less aggressive.
I am far more motivated, to focus, on a discursive exchange for mediation, that
will help to maintain, both: peace and stability, for both: my family, and for
America. I see war, as a negative event, and, as a loss-even if, the US
government tells me, that America has won again. I worry about my children
dying.
I worry about how, the violence impacts other
countries, and other families overseas-as well. I have never had the need, to
kill everyone-instead, of signing an honest peace treaty. I would prefer, to
take International arguments, to an International court. I could never support
suicide bombings. I do not want to die! I just got here. I have a right to
live. I should have the opportunity, to live my life, in peace, and with
happiness-the American government promised me, and has not delivered.
Since 2008, Cyberspace is officially
regarded as a distinct military domain, along with land, sea and air for many countries
(Goel, 2011) (Koltuksuz and Yucel 200, 213). Other suggestions, to improve the national ethos-post
9/11, have been based, on an increased role, for the Internet, in relaying/sharing
intelligence information-to those, in immediate need, and at distant/remote
locations-where intelligence information retrieval, is almost impossible, by:
HUMINT:
In his seminal piece
entitled, “The Wiki and a Blog: Towards a Complex Adaptive Intelligence
Community” (2005), Calvin Andrus identified using wikis and blogs in the United
States Intelligence Community (USIC) as a possible solution to their
information sharing challenges in a world after the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
terrorist attacks. Andrus asserted that intelligence based decision making was
moving towards real-time, live environments, and that the
“intelligence-decision-implementation cycle”, such as when new security issues
emerge in Baghdad and are vetted through decision-makers in Washington, can now
be as short as 15 minutes. The ability to provide concise and quality
intelligence under a compressed cycle requires comprehensive intelligence
sharing using central locations of information within the USIC. (Chomik 2011,
96)
I support the initiative,
to increase the role, that is played by the Internet, in collecting, and
verifying intelligence information. I utilize the Internet, and information
available online, as valuable information resources-to both: draw intelligence
from, as well as, contribute intelligence information to.
Many social networking websites-however, like:
Facebook, Twitter, Fling, Instagram, Tumblr, etc., are not comfortable, with
the: civil and human rights, that are afforded to Americans. It is illegal, for
social networking websites, to edit comments, and photos, when they fall within
the purview, of what is legal within the US, and allowable-as permitted, by our
US Constitution, and Bill of Rights. As previously stated, I am a practicing
freelance reporter. I am kicked out of online social networking websites-all-of-the-time,
for expressing and honest opinion, for posting an honest complaint, and, for
asking a normal question.
However, in America, we have a new
money problem-whereby entrepreneurs believe, that by amassing a certain amount,
of currency-they, are no longer required to abide by, US laws. Men, like
Zuckerburg of Facebook, travel all over the US, and all over the world, with a
giant wallet fat with money, and, they literally do-whatever they want-in the
face, of every US or international law, on the books. I get the impression,
after having grown up in the US, and, after having to apply for political
asylum in Europe, and now, I am also applying for immigration-to another
country-that Americans think, that everything is for sale, and-that is simply,
not the case, or legal!
New Hybrid Intelligence
Theory of Russia:
The American, intelligence community and agencies,
as-a-whole, has faltered, and, has failed to recover, since: 9/11. Russia, however,
is presently experiencing, one success, after another. Russia-like myself, has
chosen to utilize, and to apply, the intelligence theory of: “matrix/synergy/hybrid.”
Russia, has had great success, with a: “hybrid intelligence theory,” and, I
therefore already know, that the theory works. I picked a winner! Russia, and
America-unfortunately, are not close politically, and therefore-although, US
intelligence, knows some, about the tactics, and maneuvers, applied with the: “hybrid
intelligence theory,” utilized by Russia-not all the details, are known.
“Hybrid conflict takes place in
the intermediate spaces, or at the seams of traditional ways of thinking (Giegerich
2016, 69).” Russia, most recently, utilized: “hybrid intelligence theory,” to
enact a peaceful change of power, in the Crimea, from terrorists in the
Ukraine, back to the centralized Russian government, in Moscow-under the
direction, of President Putin. I am a supporter of “hybrid warfare- like
Russia, and, I have too, have stepped out, of the: “little black box” (Shepherd
2009, 208).
Conclusion:
Russian Hybrid Warfare
Intelligence-The New Game Theory Intelligence Theory!
“Hybrid Warfare”-as defined and
utilized, by Russia, is much closer, to the original: “Game Theory (Hollis 1992,
120).” I.e., if America and Russia, were both people-instead of countries, what
would Mother Russia think, of Uncle Sam’s intentions (Hollis 1992, 174)? I
think, the future, of intelligence theory, is: “hybrid warfare theory.” Russia,
has already demonstrated, that: “hybrid warfare theory,” is effective, and can
be non-violent. “Hybrid warfare theory,” is an improved upon version, of the
original: “Game theory,”-it is a military game of intelligence, for the “intelligencia”-it
is fun, challenging, and it is also: too fast, and too complicated. What is
your IQ? “Playa Playa,” or, will you be sitting this round out? Game.
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